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Levels of Centralisation and Autonomy in Russia’s “Party of Power:” Cross-Regional 
Variations  
Petr Panov and Cameron Ross 
 
Abstract 
The institutionalization and nationalisation of Russia’s party system, which is dominated by 
United Russia (UR), has played a major role in the building of Putin’s ‘power vertical’. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that formal relations within United Russia are highly centralized, 
informal practices allow for far greater degrees of regional autonomy. Focusing on UR’s candidate 
selection for the 2011 Duma election this paper provides an examination of cross-regional 
variations in the relations between UR’s Party Centre and its regional branches. As electoral 
legislation requires the segmentation of party lists into “regional groups”, the composition of the 
regional lists, specifically the share of “native candidates”, is considered as an indicator of the 
level of autonomy of regional branches. Ordinal regression analysis confirms our main theoretical 
hypotheses. In the more financially autonomous regions, UR’s regional branches will have more 
leverage and bargaining power in their relations with the Party Centre. The second influential 
factor is heterogeneity: the more a region deviates, in one way or another, from the average (all-
Russian) indicators, the less the region is subordinate to the Party Centre. 
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Introduction 
Many authors have noted the impact of federalism on the organisation of political parties. 
As Biezen and Hopkin note, in multi-level polities ‘parties are obliged to interact with their voters 
in a variety of different ways: as ‘national’ parties seeking to run the government of the state, as 
local parties seeking power at the municipal level, and as ‘regional’ parties seeking to govern a 
particular territory or nation within the state’ (2004, p. 1). Moreover, for Gibson, federal systems, 
‘through the powers and political resources they impart to political actors located at different points 
in the federal structure… can shape the nature of party competition, the structures and incentives 
for politicians, and the decentralization of parties and party systems’ (2004, p. 21).  
In turn, party organization can also have important consequences for the operation of 
federal political systems. Strong and cohesive national parties have an important integrative 
function in federal states binding together the diverse subjects of the federation. However, if parties 
are over-centralized in their structures and operation and do not reflect the interests of the 
constituent units this can also lead to tensions and conflict between the Centre and the federal 
subject, particularly in multi-national federations. Such a situation has now emerged in Russia 
where regional parties are prohibited, and all of Russia’s regional assemblies are dominated by the 
Kremlin’s ‘party of power’, United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) (Ross, 2010).  
The institutionalization of a new party system has played a significant role in the building 
of Putin’s ‘power vertical’. Regional parties, which were prolific in the 1990s, were banned after 
the adoption of 2001 Federal Law on Political Parties. Moreover, the introduction of proportional 
representation for regional assembly elections in 2003 has led to the widespread penetration of 
federal parties into regional legislatures (Golosov 2011). By 2007-8 a new party system with a 
very high degree of party nationalisation had been created. It is built around one party – United 
Russia (UR) - which dominates the membership of all regional assemblies (see Gel’man and Ross 
2010, Panov 2010, Panov and Ross 2013).  
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Party building in UR has been characterised by what Panebianco terms ‘territorial 
penetration from above’ rather than ‘territorial diffusion’ from below (Roberts 2012 p. 176). As 
Roberts notes, UR relies on what may be termed ‘a centralised party model’ under which regional 
branches and rank and file members are directly subordinate to the Central Executive Committee 
and the Party Centre. This ‘pyramid-structured organisation is superimposed over the existing 
territorial boundaries of the Russian Federation, identical in form from one region to another, with 
efforts made from the outset to ensure this conformity’ (Ibid, p. 151).  
However, the success of the UR’s penetration into the regions has largely been dependent 
on the support of regional governors and administrations. As the former Deputy Head of the 
Russian Presidential Administration, Surkov noted in 2006, ‘In the overwhelming majority of 
regions, UR relies on the incumbent authorities – regional leaders, city mayors, and so on’ 
(Roberts, 2012, p. 177). Slider also makes the point that, ‘whereas in the past a significant number 
of Moscow-based politicians had been chosen to head regional party bodies, by late 2008 there 
had been a marked increase in the number of deputies of regional assemblies (most often the 
speakers of the assemblies) serving as UR leaders’ (2010, p. 262). Moreover, as Chaisty notes, in 
2011 the main recruiting ground for UR candidates to the State Duma were members of regional 
elites. Thus, for example, just under 30 percent of UR candidates held posts in regional executive 
bodies or were deputies of regional assemblies (2013, p. 10). Consequently, whilst formal relations 
within United Russia are highly centralized, as we shall demonstrate, informal relations allow for 
far greater degrees of regional autonomy. In this study we examine the degree to which regional 
branches of UR are subordinate to the top party bodies at the centre (hereafter, the “Party Centre”). 
Are there cross-regional variations? If so, how can these be explained?  
Before we turn to examine these issues we start with a brief discussion on how to measure 
multi-level party organization and what factors influence the level of centralization and autonomy 
in political parties. We argue that in Russia’s case the candidate selection process is the best 
indicator for the measurement of cross-regional variations in the relations between UR’s Party 
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Centre and its regional branches. We then turn to an analysis of candidate selection procedures. 
We develop a new index – the share of ‘native candidates’ – and provide a comparative study of 
the composition of UR regional lists for the 2011 Duma Elections. Finally, we test some hypothesis 
concerning the factors that influence the level of centralization and autonomy within UR. 
 
Intra-Party Centralisation and Regional Autonomy: Measuring and Explanations 
Scholars have sought to measure levels of intra-party centralisation and regional autonomy 
by examining the powers of regional party branches over: 1) selection of the party leaders; 2) 
involvement of regional branches in the central party executive; 3) selection of candidates for 
elections; 4) adoption of party manifestos and programmes; 5) amending the constitution of the 
party; 6) control over their local party finances (see for example, studies by Fabre 2011, Katz 2001, 
and Thorlakson 2013). However, problems of gaining access to the necessary research materials 
and data in Russia, has made it impossible for us to examine all these aspects of 
centralisation/autonomy in our study of UR. In this article we focus on the degree of autonomy 
which regional party leaders are able to maintain over the selection of candidates to the State 
Duma. This is an area where we have been able to access reliable data for all the regional branches 
of UR.   
As William Cross notes, ‘candidate selection is one of the central functions of political 
parties’ (2008, p. 597). Candidate nomination has also become an important test of the internal 
democratic strength of party organizations. Thus, for example, Gallagher (1988, p. 1) has argued 
that ‘the way in which political parties select their candidates may be used as an acid test of how 
democratically they conduct their internal affairs’, and candidate selection for Katz, is ‘one of the 
central defining functions of a political party in a democracy’ (2001, p. 278). According to Rahat 
and Hazan, candidate selection systems vary according to four dimensions: ‘1) candidacy, i.e., 
possible restrictions on the eligibility for candidacy, 2) party selectorates, i.e., inclusiveness versus 
exclusiveness of the selectorate in the selection process, 3) decentralization, i.e., the locus of 
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control; and 4) voting/appointment systems, i.e., how candidates are nominated’ (2001, pp. 297–
9 ).  
The method employed to select candidates is a good barometer of the degree to which a 
party organisation is centralised or decentralised (Lundell, 2004). Thus, for example, ‘candidates 
might, at one extreme, be selected in primaries open for all eligible voters; at the other, they can 
be picked by the party leader alone. Other possibilities are selection by all party members in the 
constituency; by delegates at local conventions; by a constituency committee; by the regional 
organization; by national organs or by a few national faction leaders’ (Gallagher 1988, p. 1). In 
addition, Norris alerts us to another important dimension, namely the degree of institutionalization 
(formal/informal) in the selection process. As she observes (1996, p. 324), ‘In formal systems, the 
selection process is characterized by detailed, explicit and standardized rules which are relatively 
clear to outside observers, whereas an informal selection process is less bureaucratic and rarely 
made explicit’, which is very much the case in the Russian Federation.  
Federalism and Party Centralisation  
Deschouwer (2005, p. 22) stresses four features of federalism that impact on a party’s 
organisation: 1) the interconnectedness of the level of a federal political system; 2) the degree of 
autonomy of the regions; 3) the degree of asymmetry of the federation; 4) the homogeneity/ 
heterogeneity of society. In this light, it is important to remember that Russia is the largest multi-
national federation in the world. However, the Russian polity does not operate according to the 
classic principles of federalism. Since the inauguration of Vladimir Putin as Russian President in 
2000, federalism has come under attack as the President has sought to create a highly centralised 
form of rule - a “power vertical” stretching from the Kremlin to the grass roots (see Ross 2010, 
Gel'man and Ryzhenkov 2011).  Moreover, behind the formal veneer of constitutionalism and the 
rule of law, an important aspect of intergovernmental relations in Russia are the myriad of informal 
relations which operate between political and economic elites at the centre and in the regions. The 
Russian Federation is also highly asymmetric. The current 85 federal subjects vary widely in the 
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size of their territories and populations, and their socio-economic status and their ethnic 
composition.1  
Relations between members of the top leadership of UR and members of the regional 
branches will often be conducted through informal channels behind closed doors, and different 
regions will exercise different levels of leverage. Thus, for example, such factors as the size of the 
regions, their industrial base and economic power, their patronage ties to the central Party 
leadership, and the number of UR party members (which varied in 2010 from 8000 in the Republic 
of Adygeya to 128,000 in Tatarstan), will play an important role in determining the relations 
between the party’s regional branches and the central leadership. 
   
Candidate Selection in United Russia 
Formally candidate selection procedures in UR are highly centralized. Candidate 
nominations for Federal elections are made by the Party Congress which according to article 8.3.1 
of the UR’s Charter is the supreme authority in the party. According to article 8.3.4 the Congress 
has the powers to make decisions on all aspects of internal party affairs, including the 
reorganization of the party’s structure, the abolition of regional departments and other local 
branches of the party. Delegates to the Congress also vote in secret ballot for the final list of 
candidates for elections to the State Duma. Moreover, UR central bodies (the General Council and 
the Presidium of the General Council) are of great importance in candidate nominations for sub-
national elections. Although candidates for regional legislatures, governors and mayors of regional 
capitals are nominated by conferences of UR’s regional branches, all these decisions have to be 
endorsed by the Party Centre (Article 13.7.7 of UR’s Charter).2  
                                                 
1 Our study does not include the two new federal subjects which became part of the Russian 
Federation with the accession of Crimea in March 2014 and which raised the number of federal 
subjects from 83 to 85. 
2 UR’s Charter, available at: http://er.ru/party/rules/#13, accessed 8 May 2014. 
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However, the formal rules of endorsement do not mean that the Party Centre exercises total 
control over all sub-national elections. In actual fact, the Party Centre is only able to control some 
of the nominations, leaving the rest to the discretion of the regional branches. Consequently, the 
actual degree of centralization of candidate selection for regional elections differs greatly across 
the federation. However, as the process of nominating candidates is informal in nature, there are 
no reliable statistics that we can employ to conduct a comparative study of candidate nominations 
at the regional level. Moreover, since regional elections are held at different times, the influence 
of contextual factors (e.g., the current political situation) would distort the results of such an 
analysis. For these reasons it makes much more sense to examine the levels of centralization of 
candidate nominations for elections at the national level where we have much more reliable data.  
The process of candidate selection for Duma elections differs from that laid down in the 
formal party rules. Specifically, although candidate nomination for federal elections is the 
exclusive responsibility of the Party Centre, in actual fact, regional branches take an active part in 
this process. An important factor here, are some of the special features of the Russian electoral 
system. In 2011 as well as in 2007, all the deputies in the State Duma were elected in PR party list 
contests and all of the seats were allocated to a single Federal electoral district. Russian electoral 
legislation requires that the total number of candidates included in the list should not exceed 600. 
The federal part of the list of candidates must not exceed 10 candidates. All other candidates must 
be divided between ‘regional lists’ that are made up of ‘groups of candidates which correspond to, 
‘a subject of the Russian Federation, groups of subjects of the Russian Federation, or a part of the 
territory of a subject of the Russian Federation.’ The number of regional groups of candidates must 
not be less than seventy.3  
                                                 
3 The Federal Law on the Election on Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly 
of the Russian Federation. Ch.6, available at: http://cikrf.ru/eng/law/FL-51-FZ.html, 
accessed 8 May 2014.  
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There are a number of positive reasons for this ‘segmentation’ of the party lists. Firstly, 
this helps to bring deputies closer to their voters and constituents. The adoption of a single electoral 
district has the disadvantage of producing a single electoral constituency with an extremely high 
‘district magnitude’ of 450, and this impedes the interaction of deputies and their voters. Splitting 
party list into regional groups is intended to alleviate this problem.  
The second reason is to encourage regional politicians to participate more actively in 
election campaigns. The creation of regional groups means that the number of seats which each 
regional branch of UR receives will depend on the number of votes that are cast for UR in a 
particular region.  
Finally, this rule is very advantageous to UR as it allows the party to utilize the powers of 
its regional governors in election campaigns. As Golosov notes (2013), regional governors have 
been made directly responsible for the election results of the ‘party of power’ in federal elections, 
and likewise Reuter and Robertson (2012) have found strong and consistent evidence that 
appointment patterns are primarily inﬂuenced by the degree to which UR branches perform (and 
over-perform) their duties of ‘bringing home the votes,’ and similar findings have been confirmed 
by Reisinger and Moraski (2013). 
At the same time, the ‘segmented’ party list provides regional politicians with new 
opportunities. Since they are responsible for the results of their regional groups, they will strive to  
influence who is nominated to the lists, and they will also expect to be rewarded for the ‘positive 
results’ obtained by their nominees. Consequently, in drawing up its party lists, the Party Centre 
will often have to share its decision-making powers with its regional branches. Such a sharing of 
powers will be informal, as the formal rules governing candidate nomination give such powers 
exclusively to the Party Congress. Hence, the composition of regional party lists will depend on 
the informal relations that exist between the Party Centre and regional branches.  
Both sides will pursue their own interests and push for the nomination of their preferred 
candidates. Regional party elites will strive to promote their own ‘native candidates.’ The Party 
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Centre has to take into account the interests of regional branches, but it will also have its own 
candidates – officials and top bureaucrats loyal to the government, incumbents, businessmen, 
NGO’s leaders, famous public figures (actors, sportsmen), etc. However, since the Party Centre 
does not have its ‘own list’, these candidates have to be included in the regional party lists.  
Consequently, the final composition of the regional lists will thus often be the result of a 
compromise between the Party Centre and the regional branches. The extent to which the Party 
Centre is able to impose its candidates on a particular regional list will reflect the specific power 
relations between the Party Centre and the regional branches. Consequently, the share of ‘native 
candidates’ in regional party lists for elections to the State Duma may be considered as a good 
proxy for the measurement of the degree of subordination of regional branches to the Party Centre. 
 In some cases the party will impose its “outsider” candidates (Vikings) onto a region’s 
party list. Thus, for example in 2011 Vladimir Pekhtin failed to regain his place on the Party List 
in Primorsky Krai and the Party Centre posted him to Arkhangelsk Oblast’ where he was an 
outsider with no previous experience of working in the region.4 In other case, as we shall discuss 
below, native candidates will win out over outsiders. 
 
‘Native Candidates’ in UR’s Regional Lists for the 2011 Duma Elections 
The rules governing the selection of candidates for the 2011 Duma elections were slightly 
different to those in operation for the 2007 Duma elections. In 2009 delegates to the XI United 
Party Congress ruled that internal party voting (primaries) could be used to select candidates5. In 
                                                 
4 See, http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1435419.html#ixzz3RyYSMuki, accessed 15 February 
2015. 
5 One more special feature of UR’s election campaign has to be mentioned. On the eve of 2011 
Duma elections the ‘All-Russian People’s Front’ was founded by the Kremlin. The Front was 
created to help bolster the flagging electoral support of the ‘party of power’. As the Front does not 
have the official status of a political party, it is not permitted to stand in elections. However it was 
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the run up to elections for the State Duma in 2011 over 4700 candidates competed in UR primaries. 
At first sight it may appear that primaries serve as additional proof for the thesis that regional 
branches take an active part in candidate selection. However, it is important to stress that UR’s 
Charter does not oblige the party to be bound by the results of the primaries. In total one fifth of 
the winners of the primaries subsequently failed to achieve a place on the regional party lists. For 
example, in Stavropol region the will of the electorate was completely ignored when none of the 
winners of the regional primaries were given a place on the Party List. The first five places on the 
regional list were taken by the Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin (who did not participate in the 
primaries), the Military Commissar Yuri Em (who did not participate in the primaries), Andrey 
Murga, President of the Stavropol Krai Chamber of Commerce (ranked 7th in the primaries), State 
Duma deputy Stanislav Govorukhin (ranked 6th in the primaries), the General Director of the 
Centre for Metrology and Standardization, Valery Zerenkov (also did not participate in the 
primaries). In Perm region one of the winners of the primaries was the billionaire Anatoly Lomakin 
(Director of the Joint Stock Company, International Potash), who was a sponsor of the local branch 
of UR. But in the Party list he was placed fifth. The top places on the list went to the Russian 
Minister of Natural Resources Yuri Trutnev, followed by Duma deputies Valery Trapeznikov and 
Andrei Klimov, and the TV presenter Alexei Pushkov (none of whom participated in the 
primaries).6  
In accordance with electoral legislation, UR drew up a party list of 597 candidates in 2011. 
The only person, who was included in the Federal part of the list, was President Medvedev. The 
                                                 
decided that UR would include representatives of the Front in its party lists. In total, the Front was 
given 185 places. The inclusion of members of the Front did not change the fundamentals of the 
bargaining process between the Party Centre and regional branches which is the focus of this study.  
6 http://www.mk.ru/politics/article/2011/09/28/627919-blizhe-k-telu-damyi-i-gospoda.html, 
accessed 8 May 2014. 
12 
 
remaining 596 candidates were divided into 80 regional lists. In 2007, UR’s party list of 600 
candidates was also headed by one person (President Putin) and it was divided into 83 regional 
groups. As a rule, both in 2007 and 2011 each of the regional groups corresponded to a ‘subject of 
the Russian Federation’, with the exception of three small federal subjects (the Nenets 
Autonomous District was included in the list of Arkhangelsk Oblast’; the Jewish Autonomous 
Okrug in Khabarovsk Krai, and Chukotka in Magadan Oblast’). In 2007, there was more than one 
regional list in two regions (2 lists in Voronezh Oblast’ and 3 lists in Volgograd Oblast’).  
Since Russian regions have significant variations in the size of their populations, there are 
also wide variations in the number of candidates in regional party lists: in 2007 these varied from 
4 to 27, and in 2011 they ranged from 3 to 30. The distribution of seats between regional lists has 
also been very uneven: between 1 (Magadan Oblast’7) and 15 (Bashkortostan and Moscow) in 
2007; and between 0 (Magadan Oblast’ and Altai Republic8) and 15 (Moscow) in 2011. 
In order to distinguish ‘native candidates’ from ‘non-native’ candidates (the so-called 
Vikings ) in regional lists, we have analysed the biographies of each candidate, and in particular 
their current position and career trajectory.9 We classify those candidates who worked in their 
regions in 2011 (“current position”) as ‘native’, independent of their place of birth or career 
trajectory. We also classified as ‘native candidates’ those individuals who were born and began 
their careers in the regions which nominated them, even in those cases where they did not work in 
                                                 
7 The Magadan regional list should not have been given a mandate, but Putin transferred his 
mandate to this group. 
8 Kamchatka also initially failed to receive a mandate, but Medvedev transferred his mandate to 
this group.  
9 The data are from the Federal party list of United Russia which is officially registered by the 
Central Election Commission, available at:  
http://www.cikrf.ru/law/decree_of_cec/2011/10/18/Zp11392.html, accessed 8 May 2014. 
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the regions at the time of the election in 2011. If candidates spent part of their careers in the regions 
where they were nominated, but this was not at the beginning of their careers or their current posts 
at the time of the election, they were not classified as ‘native candidates’.10  
Applying this set of rules, we have divided all candidates into ‘native candidates’ and 
Vikings. In total (if we don’t take into account Medvedev as the only candidate in the all-federal 
part of the list), there were 484 ‘native candidates’ (81.2%) and 112 Vikings among the 596 persons 
included in UR’s party list. It is noteworthy that among incumbents the share of ‘native candidates’ 
is smaller. Of the 171 incumbents, 109 are ‘native candidates’ (63.7%). 
The shares of ‘native candidates’ in each regional list are presented in Table 1. The index 
has values ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’. 
                                                 
10 Special rules have to be applied for incumbents, i.e., those candidates who were deputies of the 
Duma in 2011 and were included in UR’s party list. It is interesting to note that there were 171 
such individuals among the 597 members of UR’s party list. UR had 315 Duma deputies in 2011, 
which means that 144 incumbents were not reselected. Since most incumbents currently live and 
work in Moscow, their current posts cannot be taken as a sign of their identification as ‘natives’ 
or ‘Vikings’, therefore, we focus on their posts at the point when they were first elected to the 
Duma. An incumbent is defined as a ‘native candidate’ if she/he lived in the region or at least had 
a strong connections (for example, business links) with the region at the time of their elections. 
Otherwise, we consider them as ‘Vikings’, even if they were elected from their region many times.  
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Table 1. Results of UR’s Regional Lists and Shares of ‘Native Candidates’  
  
2007 2011 2011: Share of ‘native candidates’ 
UR 
vote  
Candid
ates in 
list  
Manda
tes 
won UR vote  
Candid
ates in 
list 
Manda
tes 
won 
Diff in 
mandat
es all list 
winning 
positions 
elected 
candid.  
Adygeya         0.7097 4 1 0.6021 4 1 0 0.7500 1.0000 1.0000 
Altay rep.       0.6946 4 1 0.5333 3 0 -1 1.0000 1.0000 n/a 
Altay Krai      0.5469 9 5 0.3717 10 3 -2 0.7000 0.4000 0.6667 
Amur       0.6975 6 2 0.4353 5 1 -1 0.6000 0.5000 0,0000 
Archangelsk  0.5672 5 2 0.3190 5 1 -1 0.6000 0.5000 0.0000 
Astrakhan       0.5801 5 2 0.6017 4 2 0 0.7500 0.5000 0.5000 
Bashkortostan   0.8312 15 15 0.7050 17 12 -3 0.8235 0.8000 0.7500 
Belgorod        0.6539 7 4 0.5116 7 3 -1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Bryansk         0.6177 4 3 0.5012 4 2 -1 0.7500 0.6667 0.5000 
Buryatiya        0.6559 5 2 0.4902 5 1 -1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Vladimir        0.5675 6 3 0.3827 8 2 -1 0.6250 0.6667 0.5000 
Volgograd       0.5774 13* 5* 0.3548 10 3 -2 0.6000 0.6000 0.6667 
Vologda         0.6047 5 3 0.3340 5 1 -2 0.8000 0.6667 1.0000 
Voronezh        0.5697 8* 5* 0.5005 9 5 0 0.6667 0.4000 0.4000 
Dagestan        0.8919 10 8 0.9144 14 10 2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Zabaikal’skii Krai           0.6275 6 2 0.4328 5 1 -1 0.8000 0.5000 0.0000 
Ivanovo         0.6076 6 2 0.4012 6 1 -1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Ingushetiya      0.9872 4 1 0.9096 3 1 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Irkutsk         0.5869 8 5 0.3493 8 2 -3 0.8750 1.0000 1.0000 
Kabardino-Balkariya    0.9612 4 3 0.8191 4 3 0 0.7500 0.6667 0.6667 
Kaliningrad     0.5738 6 3 0.3707 7 3 0 0.5714 0.3333 0.3333 
Kalmykiya        0.7270 4 1 0.6610 3 1 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Kaluga          0.6165 7 2 0.4042 5 1 -1 0.6000 0.0000 0.0000 
Kamchatka    0.6835 4 1 0.4525 3 1** 0 0.6667 0.0000 0.0000 
Karach.-Cherkessiya 0.9290 4 2 0.8984 4 2 0 0.7500 0.5000 0.5000 
15 
 
Kareliya         0.5728 4 1 0.3226 3 1 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Kemerovo        0.7686 11 9 0.6424 11 7 -2 0.7273 0.6667 0.7143 
Kirov           0.5538 5 3 0.3490 5 2 -1 0.8000 0.6667 0.5000 
Komi 0.6206 4 2 0.5881 4 2 0 0.7500 1.0000 1.0000 
Kostroma        0.5635 4 1 0.3074 4 1 0 0.7500 0.0000 0.0000 
Krasnodar       0.6189 15 11 0.5615 19 11 0 0.8421 0.7273 0.7273 
Krasnoyarsk     0.6067 9 5 0.3670 10 3 -2 0.8000 0.8000 0.6667 
Kurgan          0.6443 6 2 0.4441 5 1 -1 0.8000 0.5000 1.0000 
Kursk           0.6274 6 3 0.4572 6 2 -1 0.8333 0.6667 0.5000 
Leningrad Oblast’ 0.5923 5 3 0.3354 8 2 -1 0.7500 1.0000 0.5000 
Lipetsk        0.6230 6 3 0.4009 6 2 -1 0.8333 0.6667 0.5000 
Magadan  0.5524 4 1** 0.4104 3 0 -1 0.6667 1.0000 n/a 
Marii El         0.6754 4 2 0.5224 4 1 -1 0.7500 0.5000 0.0000 
Mordoviya        0.9341 7 4 0.9162 6 4 0 0.6667 0.5000 0.5000 
Moscow          0.5415 27 15 0.4662 30 15 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Moscow Oblast’     0.5976 22 14 0.3310 24 7 -7 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Murmansk        0.5511 5 2 0.3202 5 1 -1 0.6000 0.5000 0.0000 
Nizhegorod Oblast’       0.6063 13 7 0.4455 11 5 -2 0.6364 0.4286 0.2000 
Novgorod        0.6313 5 2 0.3458 3 1 -1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Novosibirsk     0.5907 10 5 0.3384 10 3 -2 0.8000 0.8000 1.0000 
Omsk            0.6014 9 4 0.3961 8 3 -1 0.7500 0.5000 0.3333 
Orenburg        0.6031 8 4 0.3489 8 2 -2 0.7500 0.5000 0.0000 
Oryol            0.5985 5 2 0.3899 5 1 -1 0.6000 0.0000 0.0000 
Penza           0.7031 6 4 0.5630 6 3 -1 0.6667 0.7500 0.6667 
Perm            0.6206 10 5 0.3628 10 3 -2 0.7000 0.6000 0.6667 
Primorsky Krai      0.5487 6 3 0.3299 6 2 -1 0.6667 0.6667 0.5000 
Pskov           0.5673 6 2 0.3665 5 1 -1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Rostov          0.7190 13 11 0.5022 13 7 -4 0.7692 0.7273 0.5714 
Ryazan          0.5710 7 2 0.3979 7 2 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Samara          0.5608 11 5 0.3937 12 4 -1 0.7500 0.6000 0.5000 
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St Petersburg 0.5033 19 7 0.3535 16 5 -2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Saratov         0.6481 10 6 0.6489 12 6 0 0.9167 0.8333 0.8333 
Sakhalin        0.6296 4 1 0.4191 4 1 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Sverdlovsk Oblast’       0.6204 11 9 0.3271 11 4 -5 0.9091 0.8889 0.7500 
North Ossetiya    0.7178 4 1 0.6790 4 2 1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Smolensk        0.5392 4 2 0.3623 4 1 -1 0.7500 0.5000 0.0000 
Stavropol       0.6220 9 5 0.4911 9 4 -1 0.7778 0.8000 0.7500 
Tambov          0.5979 5 2 0.6666 5 3 1 0.6000 0.0000 0.3333 
Tatarstan       0.8107 18 14 0.7783 18 13 -1 0.8889 0.8571 0.8462 
Tver            0.5971 7 3 0.3844 6 2 -1 0.8333 0.6667 0.5000 
Tomsk           0.5841 6 2 0.3751 5 1 -1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Tula            0.6172 7 3 0.6132 8 4 1 0.5000 0.3333 0.5000 
Tuva            0.8900 4 1 0.8529 4 1 0 0.7500 1.0000 1.0000 
Tyumen           0.7357 6 4 0.6221 6 4 0 0.8333 0.7500 0.7500 
Udmurtiya        0.6057 6 3 0.4509 5 2 -1 0.6000 0.3333 0.0000 
Ulyanovsk       0.6624 7 3 0.4356 7 2 -1 0.4286 0.3333 0.0000 
Khabarovsk  0.6067 8 3 0.3814 6 2 -1 0.8333 0.6667 0.5000 
Khakasiya        0.5953 4 1 0.4013 4 1 0 0.7500 0.0000 0.0000 
Khanty-Mansi AO    0.6595 6 3 0.4101 6 2 -1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Chelyabinsk     0.6111 11 8 0.5028 12 6 -2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Chechnya 0.9936 6 4 0.9948 7 4 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Chuvashiya      0.6227 7 3 0.4342 7 2 -1 0.7143 0.6667 0.5000 
Yakutiya          0.6399 5 2 0.4916 5 1 -1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Yamalo-Nenets AO  0.7935 5 2 0.7168 4 2 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Yaroslavl       0.5317 8 3 0.2904 6 1 -2 0.6667 0.6667 1.0000 
* There were 3 regional lists in Volgograd and 2 in Voronezh. Figures are summarized. Volgograd: 13 = 
4+5+4 for candidates and 5 = 1+2+2 for mandates. Voronezh: 8 = 4+4 for candidates and 5 = 2+3 for 
mandates. 
** The Magadan list in 2007 and Kamchatka list in 2011 didn’t win any mandates, but Putin and Medvedev 
transferred their Duma seats to them.   
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However, the share of ‘native candidates’ in a regional list is not a good enough indicator 
on its own to measure the degree of centralization/autonomy within UR. The Russian PR electoral 
system calls for ‘closed party lists’, thus not all positions in the lists are equally important. 
Specifically, candidates with positions in the lower part of the lists will have little or no chance of 
winning a mandate. So we need to separate out those candidates who hold ‘winning positions’ 
(‘prochodnye’ candidates). Although the winning positions are decided after the elections, the 
approximate chance of a candidate winning can be calculated in advance. When the party 
leadership is drawing up its list of candidates it will have a reasonable idea of how many seats it 
expects to win in each list. The personal distribution of positions within each of the lists will be 
made in accordance with this calculation. Thus, for example, it makes no sense for the Party Centre 
to promote its ‘own candidates’ to positions at the lower end of the regional lists, as they will have 
little chance of being elected. For these reasons, we would argue that it makes more sense in this 
study to calculate the share of ‘native candidates’ as a percentage of the number of ‘winning 
positions’ in regional lists, rather than as a percentage of the total number of candidates.  
In order to define what positions are ‘winning positions’, we used the results of the previous 
election. As was noted above, the composition of UR’s party lists in 2007 and 2011 were almost 
the same and this allows us to juxtapose the results of 2007 elections and regional party lists in 
2011.11 The assumption is quite simple: we assume that UR’s results in the 2007 elections were 
extraordinary high, and it is unlikely that in 2011 the UR leadership (both central and regional 
bodies) could hope for a better result than it achieved in 2007. On the other hand, there is no reason 
to suggest that UR leaders expected losses. They would in all likelihood expect the same results 
as in 2007. Therefore we presume that if UR party leaders based their calculations on the most 
optimistic forecast, they would expect the number of winning positions in a region to be equal to 
                                                 
11 In two regions (Voronezh and Volgograd oblasts), where there was more than one regional list 
in 2007, we have summed the results of these lists. 
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the number of seats that the region won in 2007.12 Hence, we use the 2007 elections results (the 
distribution of UR’s mandates between regional lists) in order to distinguish the ‘winning 
positions’ in the 2011 regional lists.13  
However, we have to take into account one special feature of Russian electoral legislation. 
Deputies elected to the State Duma have the right to refuse their mandates after the conclusion of 
the election and in these cases their seats are passed on to other members on the regional party 
lists).14 This feature has given birth to the widespread practice of parties placing well-known 
politicians or celebrities (‘locomotives’) at the top of their lists in order to boost their electoral 
chances. But some of these ‘locomotives’ have no intention of taking up their seats and therefore 
we should not consider them as winning: thus we do not count these when we come to analyse the 
                                                 
12 This assumption is confirmed indirectly by the actual distribution of seats between regional lists 
in 2011. As is well known, the elections results for UR in 2011 were significantly worse than in 
2007. While in 2007 UR won 315 seats, in 2011 this fell to 238. In general, the losses of the party 
were distributed fairly evenly between regions. 48 regional lists lost one or two seats in comparison 
to 2007. 23 regions received the same number of seats as in 2007. Only 4 regions (Dagestan, North 
Ossetiya, Tambov and Tula oblasts) received more seats than in 2007.  
13 Magadan’s regional list received no mandates. However, Putin who was number 1 in UR’s 
party list, transferred his mandate to the Magadan regional group. Therefore we count Magadan 
list as having one winning position.  
14 Art. 83 of the Law on State Duma Elections notes that in the case of a refusal, the mandate is 
passed on to the next person in the regional group and article Article 89 notes that in the case of 
early termination of office, the mandate is passed on to the person from the same regional group, 
not necessarily the next person down on the list (‘The Federal Law on the Election on Deputies 
of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation’, available at: 
http://cikrf.ru/eng/law/FL-51-FZ.html, accessed 8 May 2014). 
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composition of the winning positions. The main criteria we employ here are based on the 
expectations concerning a candidate’s intentions when they were nominated, not on the results. 
We suppose that such expectations are invoked by the current status of the candidate – 
‘locomotive’. Thus, if a candidate is a high ranking regional official (governor, head of regional 
governments, chair of regional legislatures), a common expectation emerges that she/he will refuse 
the mandate after the elections.15  
In 2011 there were 9 cases when regional lists were headed by high level federal officials: 
Vice prime-ministers - Zubkov, Zhukov, Shuvalov, Kozak, Volodin, Sechin; Federal ministers - 
Shoigu, Trutnev; and Chief of the Presidential Administration Naryshkin.16 It has to be noted that 
Naryshkin and Zhukov did not refuse their mandates and took up the posts of Chair and First 
Deputy Chair of the State Duma, respectively. However, even if these decisions were taken in 
advance, they were not made public. It was expected that both these politicians would refuse their 
mandates.  
At the same time, there were also some cases where well-known politician – incumbents 
played the role of locomotives. However, unlike government officials, they were expected to 
continue their work in the Duma. Therefore, despite the fact that there were some exceptions (the 
                                                 
15 The inclusion of governors at the top of regional lists was the most common practice in the 
Duma elections (54 cases in 2011). Governors were usually granted the first position in regional 
lists although there were some exceptions to the rule (e.g., in Kaliningrad and Tula). The only 
case when a high regional official did not refuse his mandate was the Governor of Vologda 
Oblast’, Pozgalev. 
16 Three of these officials (Volodin, Kozak, and Trutnev) were nominated in those regions where 
they began their careers – Saratov, Perm, and St. Petersburg, respectively. Therefore they were 
considered as ‘native candidates’. 
20 
 
former Chairman of Duma Gryzlov, for example, refused his mandate) there is no reason not to 
take these officials into account when defining winning positions.17 
In sum, what is most important here is whether candidates were more likely to have been 
perceived as those who would refuse their mandates at the time when they were nominated. Thus, 
we do not take very senior federal and regional officials (e.g., governors) into account when 
defining the ‘winning positions.’18 All other administrative posts such as regional ministers, 
deputies of regional legislatures, mayors (including mayors of regional capitals) as well as 
incumbents are treated as ‘ordinary’ candidates, although some of these people (as well as many 
individuals who had no official posts) refused their mandates after the elections.  
In light of the above discussion we calculated the share of ‘native candidates’ in winning 
positions in the regional lists (see Table 1). In total there were 315 winning positions which were 
the same as the number of seats UR won in 2007. The share of ‘native candidates’ in the winning 
positions was 74.3% (234 persons). This is, as would be expected, less than the share of ‘native 
candidates’ among all of the candidates (81.2%).  
Finally, it is possible to count the share of ‘native candidates’ among the 238 who were 
elected (see Table 1). Notably, the share of ‘native candidates’ decreased again - to 70.2% (167 
persons), although they were still in a majority. Nevertheless, the share of ‘native candidates 
elected’ is interesting just for comparison and is not a good indicator of the degree of centralization 
and autonomy within UR.  
As regard incumbents, generally they had more promising positions than the other 
candidates. Out of 171 incumbents, 143 (83.6%) were in winning positions; and 121 were elected. 
Interestingly, the ‘Viking incumbents’ were more successful than ‘native incumbents’. 53 out of 
                                                 
 
18 The only exception is Novgorod Oblast’. The regional list here consisted of only 3 candidates 
and included the Governor and Chair of the regional legislature; but there were 2 winning 
positions. That is why we consider the Chair of the regional legislature as a winning position. 
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62 ‘Viking incumbents’ were in winning positions (85.6%); and 47 were elected (75.8%). Among 
the 109 ‘native incumbents’ only 90 were in winning positions (82.56%); and 74 were elected 
(67.9%). 
In order to measure the degree of subordination of regional branches to the UR Party Centre 
we calculated an index which measures the share of ‘native candidates’ who were given winning 
positions in regional party lists. In total there were 234 ‘native candidates’ and 81 Vikings, 
including 90 and 53 incumbents respectively. It seems to be no accident that most of the Vikings 
(53 out of 81) were incumbents. Usually these were politicians who realized that without the 
support of the Party Centre they would have little chance of securing one of the winning positions. 
It is striking, that almost all of the nominations from the Party Centre (47 out of 53) were 
subsequently elected. Since the election results for UR were worse in 2011 than expected, in some 
cases regional branches were forced to sacrifice their candidates, forcing them to refuse their 
mandates, in order to allow the ‘Viking’ incumbents to take their places in the Duma.  
Nonetheless, our study demonstrates that there are enormous differences in the share of 
‘native candidates’ in the different regions. Whilst in 28 regions all of the winning positions were 
occupied by ‘native candidates’, in 6 regions all the winning positions were occupied by Vikings.  
 
What Factors Influence on the Level of Centralization and Autonomy within UR  
Our independent variables have been drawn from the theoretical literature on parties in 
multi-level polities (see Stepan 2004, Biezen and Hopkin 2004, Gibson 2004, Deschouwer 2005, 
Thorlakson 2013). The following list of variables has been selected to explain the cross-regional 
variations in candidate selection which we discussed above: 
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1. The formal constitutional status of the federal units. Before the accession of Crimea in 
March 2014, there were 83 federal subjects19 - 46 oblasts, 9 krais, 21 republics, 4 autonomous 
okrugs, 1 autonomous Oblast’ and 2 federal cities. The Russian Federation is constitutionally 
asymmetrical. Whilst article 5.4 declares that all subjects of the federation are equal, some are 
clearly more equal than others. In fact there are three distinct classifications of ‘federal subject’ 
specified in the Constitution. Firstly, the twenty one ethnically based republics which are classified 
as ‘national-state formations’. Secondly, krais and oblasts, which are classified as ‘administrative-
territorial formations’; and thirdly, autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs defined as 
‘national-territorial formations’. Only the republics are defined as ‘states’ (Article 5.2) with the 
right to their own constitutions, languages, flags, hymns and other trappings of statehood (see 
Ross, 2002). Leaving aside the debate over the legal interpretation of these constitutional 
contradictions, we included ‘formal status’ as an independent variable to test whether it influences 
the degree of UR’s intra-party centralisation. Russia’s 21 ethnic republics were coded as ‘1’; all 
the other federal units – ‘0’. 
2. Financial autonomy of the regions. Since the 2000s the budget system of Russia has become 
much more centralized than was the case in the 1990s. At the present time more than 60% of 
revenues are concentrated at the federal level. However, the Federal Centre distributes a substantial 
amount of funds to the regions through various types of fiscal transfers (see Alexeev and 
Kurlyandskaya 2003, Treisman 1996, Marques, Nazrullaeva and Yakovlev 2012). Moreover, 
Russian regions vary greatly in their financial dependency/autonomy from the Centre. Since UR 
as a ‘party of power’ is embedded in the administrative system, there is a good reason to suggest 
that the degree of financial autonomy of a federal subject will influence its relations with the Party 
Centre. Thus, for example, rich ‘donor subjects’ (regions which pay more taxes to the federal 
                                                 
19 As noted above, this study does not include the two new federal subjects that became part of 
the Russian Federation with the accession of Crimea in March 2014.  
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budget than they receive back) have been more successful in carving out higher levels of political 
autonomy than the impoverished ‘recipient regions’ who depend on federal transfers from the 
centre for their economic survival. Financial autonomy is measured by the share of federal 
transfers in regional budgets.20 
3. Heterogeneity. It is well-known that Russian regions differ from each other greatly in their 
economic, demographic and social indices. It is natural to assume that the UR leadership will take 
such factors into account in conducting its relations with regional branches. Hypothetically, the 
more a region deviates, in one way or another, from the average (all-Russian) indicators, the less 
the region is likely to be subordinated by the Party Centre. In this analysis we test the most common 
variables of regional distinctiveness: 
• the logarithm of GRP per capita (deviation from national average)21  
• the share of the urban population (deviation from national average)22  
• the share of ethnic Russians in the population (deviation from national average)23 
                                                 
20 We used the data for 2011 which can be found in, Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie 
Pokazateli 2012 (Moskva: Rosstat, 2013).  
21 Calculated on the basis of GRP per capita in 2010, Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie 
Pokazateli 2012 (Moskva: Rosstat, 2013). Table 11.2. It is necessary to note that the Russian 
State Statistic Service does not record the GRP of autonomous Okrugs (AO). Therefore, Khanty-
Mansiisk AO and Yamalo-Nenets AO are not included in the analysis. 
22 Calculated on the basis of the share of urban population in 2010: Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-
ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2011 (Moskva: Rosstat, 2012).  
23 Calculated on the basis of the share of ethnic Russians in the population, Vserossiiskaya 
Perepis’ Naseleniya 2010. Table ‘National composition of the RF population’, available at: 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/perepis_itogi1612.htm. Accessed 8 May 
2014.  
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4. Governors. Alongside the above propositions which have been drawn from the  theoretical 
literature on parties in multi-level polities we also test a number of hypothesis that are drawn from 
the specific features of the Russian political system. In particular, these concern the role of senior 
regional officials – the governors (see Blakkisrud 2011, Goode 2007, Reuter 2010). During the 
period 2005-12 when gubernatorial elections were abolished, regional governor were appointed 
by the President (formally subject to confirmation by the regional legislatures). Nevertheless, it 
would be an exaggeration to consider governors as simply agents of the federal Centre. Whilst 
governors perform their functions within Putin’s hierarchical system (the ‘power vertical’), this 
has not prevented them from playing an important role as mediators between the Centre and 
regional elites. Governors have taken an active part in the candidate selection for Duma elections 
and in many cases they have pushed for the nomination of native candidates. The success of a 
governor in getting their candidates nominates will depend on two key factors. The first relates to 
variations in the distinctive structural features of regions that were discussed above. These 
objective conditions will define the ‘opportunities structures’ for governors. Here we are interested 
in a second group of factors that concerns the personal characteristics of a governor. We posit that 
‘native governors’ would be more likely to nominate ‘native candidates’. For this measurement of 
regional ‘rootedness’ we use three variables: 
• The length of tenure of a governor. We use a very simple indicator – ‘years’. 
• The method by which governors were recruited – Elected or Appointed. Although 
gubernatorial elections were abolished in 2005, there were still 24 governors in post in 
December 2011 who had been elected before the cancellation of the elections in 2005. We 
use a binominal variable: elected governors were coded as ‘1’, all others – as ‘0’. 
• The career background of the governors. As noted above there is a class of Russian 
governors who may be defined as Vikings - these are individuals who were appointed by 
the Kremlin from other regions or from the Centre. Vikings have no connections with the 
region or roots in the region before their appointment. The opposite class is ‘native 
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governors’ - those who made their careers in the region which they govern. It is logical to 
suppose that ‘native governors’ will promote ‘native candidates’. A biographical analysis 
of politicians, who held the post of governor in December 2011, allows us to divide these 
top officials into two groups: 1) ‘natives’ (52 observations) were coded as ‘1’; 2) Vikings 
(28 observations) were coded as ‘0’.  
 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
Our dependent variable is the share of ‘native candidates’ in UR’s regional lists for the 
December 2011 Duma elections. There are 8 independent variables: the formal constitutional 
status of a region, the share of federal transfers in regional budgets, three variables of heterogeneity 
and three variables concerning the features of governors. Since the dependent variable does not 
accord with normal distribution, we employ an ordinal regression model instead of the OLS 
regression - and this means that we have to rank the values of the dependent variables: 
• 1 – minimal share of ‘native candidates’, that is ‘0’ (6 regions) 
• 2 – share of ‘native candidates’ is from 0.01 to 0.25 (no observations) 
• 3 – share of ‘native candidates’ is from 0.26 to 0.49 (7 regions) 
• 4 – share of ‘native candidates’ is ‘0.5’ (12 regions) 
• 5 - share of ‘native candidates’ is from 0.51 to 0.75 (20 regions) 
• 6 - share of ‘native candidates’ is from 0.76 to 0.99 (7 regions) 
• 7 – maximum share of ‘native candidates’, that is ‘1’ (28 regions) 
A number of models of ordinal regression have been employed, and the results are 
displayed in Table 2. In Model 1, which is a basic model, all the independent variables are 
included. The analysis confirms the main theoretical expectations concerning the importance of 
such factors as federative relations and heterogeneity. Two variables - ‘share of federal transfers 
in the regional budget’ and ‘share of urban populations (deviation)’ have statistical significance 
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and the highest values of coefficients. Two other variables, which concerns heterogeneity – ‘GRP 
per capita (deviation)’ and ‘share of ethnic Russians (deviation)’ – are slightly weaker but point in 
the same direction.  
 
Table 2. Ordinal Regression Models  
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. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Est 
( St.Er.) Sig. 
Est 
( St.Er.) Sig. 
Est 
( St.Er.) Sig. 
Est 
( St.Er.) Sig. 
Formal status .322 
(.705) 
.648   .285 
(.705) 
.686 .341 
(.820) 
.677 
ShareTtransfers  -3.947 
(1.865) 
.034 -4.059 
(1.842) 
.028 -3.356 
(2.175) 
.123 -4.551 
(2.152) 
.034 
Log GRPpc (DEV) .650 
(.486) 
.181 .714 
(.477) 
.134 .662 
(.487) 
.174 .936 
(.542) 
.084 
ShareURB (DEV) 6.556 
(3.114) 
.035 6.639 
(3.068) 
.030 6.228 
(3.209) 
.052 12.737 
(4.380) 
.004 
ShareRUS (DEV) 2.378 
(2.027) 
.241 3.376 
(1.698) 
.047 2.101 
(2.125) 
.323 1.148 
(2.464) 
.641 
GOVyear -.047 
(.083) 
.570   -.053 
(.083) 
.402 -.042 
(.089) 
.631 
GOVnative .256 
(.569) 
.652   .317 
(.576) 
.583 .005 
(.662) 
.994 
GOVelected -.972 
(.971) 
.317   -1.057 
(.981) 
.281 -1.318 
(1.054) 
.211 
CandWinPosition     .048 
(.081) 
.548   
N 78* 78* 78* 68** 
Chi-square 17.614 16.025 17.884 25.676 
Sig. 0.024 0.003 0.037 0.001 
Pseudo-Nagelkerke R2 0.210 0.193 0.213 0.332 
Parallel test 0.260 0 0 .895 
Correlation  .323** .381** .361** .482** 
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* Two regions (Khanty-Mansi AO and Yamalo-Nenets AO) are lost due to the lack of data on 
GRP per capita.   
** 10 outliers are excluded. 
At the same time, the hypothesis about the formal constitutional status of regions has not 
been verified. This is not unexpected, as the formal status of a federal unit does not always provide 
the region with privileges, for example, many of the ethnic republics (e.g., Karelia, Khakasiya) are 
treated in exactly the same way as the territorially defined regions (oblasts).  
The insignificance of the personal career background of governors is especially 
noteworthy. Since all three variables have very low coefficients, the results cannot be considered 
accidental. Therefore, we can conclude that the success of governors in their efforts to promote 
‘native candidates’ depends on the ‘structural’ characteristics of a region, and not the degree of 
‘rootedness’ of the governor in the regional elite.    
Model 2 is used to test how coefficients change if we omit the non-significant variables. 
One can see that all of the coefficients increase and this confirms the results of model 1. 
Next, we have to take into account the differences between the regional lists and the number 
of positions, including winning positions. It is possible that this may affect the dependent variable. 
The more winning positions there are in the regional list, the more opportunities the regional 
branch has in bargaining with the Party Centre. An increase in the number of winning positions 
may enhance the share of ‘native candidates’ in the regional lists. However, Model 3 does not 
confirm this supposition. Adding into the equation the variable ‘number of winning positions’ does 
not noticeably change the coefficients. 
At the same time, the empirical data demonstrates that in different regions the influence of 
the different explanatory variables will vary significantly. While in some cases the ‘financial 
autonomy of the regions’ is more important, in others the impact of ‘heterogeneity’ is the most 
significant.  
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Our study shows that among the least autonomous UR regional branches are such regions 
as Tambov and Oryol oblasts which are both financially dependent on the Centre. Here the 
formation of the regional party lists took place under great pressure form the Party Centre. In 
Tambov Oblast’, where the share of federal transfers in regional budgets reached 0.48, UR had 
two deputies in the Duma in 2007, and this was expected to be the case in 2011. At the top of the 
regional party list was the Chair of the regional assembly Nikitin, but it was clear that he was a 
‘locomotive’ (‘parovoz’), so the following two positions were important. Both of the winning 
positions were delivered to Vikings. Viktor Kidyaev was an incumbent Duma deputy who was 
very loyal to the Kremlin. He was elected from Mordoviya in 2007 but in 2011, he failed to win a 
place on the Mordoviya party list and he finally settled in Tambov. Alexander Babakov was a 
Russian national politician with a scandalous reputation. He was one of the leaders of Just Russia, 
but on the eve of the 2011 Duma elections he left the party and joined the ‘All-Russian People’s 
Front’. As a reward for this switch of parties, UR gave Babakov the opportunity to compete for 
the top position in any of the regional party lists. First he tried his luck in Perm Oblast’ and then 
later in Voronezh Oblast’, but to no success. Finally, he was given the number three slot on the 
Tambov regional party list and was subsequently elected to the Duma. As a result, Tambov Oblast’ 
has no ‘native’ deputies in the Duma.24  
Oryol Oblast’ is also financially dependent on the Federal Government. The share of 
federal transfers in the regional budget is 0.43. It also had two winning positions in the regional 
party list. The first was given to Nikolay Kovalev, the former Director of the Federal Security 
Service, who had been elected to the Duma from Oryol in 2007. Actually only Kovalev was elected 
                                                 
24 http://www.taminfo.ru/expert/titarenko/14151-partijnye-sezdy-proshli-itogi-dlya-
tambovskoj.html. Accessed, 15 February 2015. 
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in 2011, since the regional party list won only one mandate. The second slot was given to Roman 
Antonov, who had been elected to the Duma in 2007 from the Nizhegorod regional party list.25    
On the other hand, in fairly financially autonomous regions we can observe the opposite 
scenario to that which occurred in the economically poorer regions. Here the native candidates 
have been in the ascendancy. Thus, for example, in Chelyabinsk Oblast’ (the share of federal 
transfers in regional budgets is less than 0.20) all 8 winning positions were won by native 
candidates (although in 2007 2 of the 8 mandates had gone to Vikings). In 2011, conversely, even 
those politicians who were promoted by the Centre (one of the leaders of pro-Kremlin Youth 
Movement Molodaya Gvardiya Vladimir Burmotov) were ‘natives.’26 Sverdlovsk Oblast’, which 
is even more financially autonomous (the share of federal transfers in the regional budget is 0.12), 
had 9 winning positions, and all of them, except one, were filled by ‘native politicians’. The only 
Viking in the regional list was Otari Arshba, a very influential figure at the highest levels of the 
Russian Government. In 2003 and 2007 he was elected to the Duma from Kemerovo Oblast’.27  
In other cases the main factor that increases the autonomy of UR regional branches is 
heterogeneity. These cases are primarily to be found in the republics of the North Caucasus – 
Dagestan, Ingushetiya, North Ossetiya, Chechnya. All the winning positions in these regions were 
filled by native candidates.  
Taken as a whole, model 1 demonstrates a fairly high level of explanatory significance. 
The correlation between actual and predicted values of the dependent variable is ‘0.323’. Turning 
to a consideration of the correlation in more detail: it is notable that the actual and predicted values 
                                                 
25 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2589871. Accessed 15 February 2015. 
26 http://ura.ru/content/chel/14-09-2011/articles/1036257037.html. Accessed 15 February 2015. 
27 http://uralpolit.ru/news/elections/elections_parties/novye-deputaty-gosdumy-ot-sverdlovskoi-
oblasti-kto-uezzhaet-v-moskvu. Accessed 15 February 2015. 
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of the dependent variable coincide in 28 observations. In 17 cases, we have a difference of only 
one rank, and in 23 cases – two ranks.  
Only 10 regions substantially deviate from the common pattern. All these deviations are in 
one direction, namely, the predicted values of the dependent variable are more than the actual 
values. The region with the highest deviation is Khakasiya where the predicted share of ‘native 
candidates should be the highest (7 in rank) but in fact none of the ‘native candidates’ were in a 
winning position. This may be explained by the fact that only one position in the regional list was 
a winning position, and it was occupied by a Viking-incumbent. 6 regions deviated from the 
predicted values by four ranks. The values of Altay Krai and Voronezh Oblast’ were predicted as 
the highest (7), but amongst the candidates less than half of the winning positions were held by 
‘native candidates.’ 4 regions were unable to include any ‘native candidates’ in winning positions 
(rank 1), although more than half (rank 5) were predicted. Although all four of the latter cases are 
fairly small regions, they had just 1 or 2 winning positions, and all of these were given to Viking-
incumbents. Finally, in three regions - Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Murmansk and Orenburg oblasts 
– a maximum rank (7) of ‘native candidates’ on winning position was predicted but only half  were 
‘native candidates’ (rank 4).  
In model 4 we excluded all 10 of the most deviant cases as outliers. One can see that the 
coefficients that were significant (variables of centralization and heterogeneity) in model 1 became 
stronger. Those coefficients that were insignificant (variables on formal status and governors’ 
features) became weaker. The values of the general coefficients (Chi-square and R2) also 
increased. The correlation between the predicted and the actual values of the dependent variable 
achieves ‘0.482’. Consequently, model 5 once again confirms our findings.  
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Conclusion  
     The institutionalization and nationalisation of Russia’s party system, which is dominated by 
United Russia, has played a major role in the building of Putin’s ‘power vertical’. Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that formal relations within United Russia are highly centralized, informal practices 
allow for far greater degrees of regional autonomy. Focusing on UR’s candidate selection for the 
2011 Duma election this paper has revealed significant variations in the relations between United 
Russia’s Party Centre and its regional branches.  
     As electoral legislation requires the segmentation of party lists into “regional groups”, the 
composition of the regional lists, specifically the share of “native candidates”, may be considered 
a good indicator of the level of autonomy of regional branches. Ordinal regression analysis 
confirms our main theoretical hypotheses. In the more financially autonomous regions, UR’s 
regional branches will have more leverage and bargaining power in their relations with the Party 
Centre.  
     Another important factor is heterogeneity: the more a region’s demographic, ethnic and socio-
economic indicators deviate from the national average, the less likely the region will be dominated 
by the Party Centre. Such a trend is particularly evident in regions where a majority of the 
population are non-Russians: this is the case even when the region is financially dependent on the 
Centre. On the other hand, the financial autonomy of a region has a positive effect on the autonomy 
of a UR regional branch even when the region does not deviate significantly from the nationwide 
average. Moreover, there are also some cases (e.g., Bashkortostan and Komi) where both factors 
(financial autonomy and heterogeneity) have a joint impact.  
Another important finding of this study is that the variables which we tested concerning 
the personal features of governors are not significant. Rather these variations can better be 
explained by ‘objective’ structural factors. The personal background may increase motivation, but 
it does not increase effectiveness. This we would argue is due to the fact that the instigation of 
Putin’s ‘power vertical’ has rendered the significance of a governor’s career background as null 
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and void. But this does not mean that the governors are mere agents of the Centre. They naturally 
will have their own interests and they will often express and defend the interest of their regional 
elites.  
Finally, the key conclusions of this study challenge the traditional view of United Russia 
as a highly centralised and hierarchical party. Formerly the party rules provide for a top-down 
centralised model of intra-party rule, but informally the grass roots leadership has been able to 
exercise considerable degrees of decision-making autonomy. As we have demonstrated, the 
percentage of ‘native candidates’ who successfully gained winning positions on regional party lists 
far outnumbers the percentage of ‘Viking outsiders’ who were imposed on local branches by the 
Party Centre. The relations between the Centre and the regions are far more complex and varied 
in scope than that suggested by Putin’s concept - the ‘power vertical’. The Party Centre will often 
strike compromise deals with its local branches to placate it members and keep regional elites on 
its side, especially when it comes to elections.  
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